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I. Introduction 
The main motivation for this paper is to provide empirical evidence on how larger liquidity 
cushions driven by Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) implementation may affect the 
overall banking community and different classes of banks in the U.S.  The key hypothesis is that 
the new liquidity ratios will negatively impact bank’s profitability and stability.  My hypothesis is 
based upon previous published literature outlined in the next section.  Bank profitability will be 
measure by its Return on Assets (ROA).  Bank stability is proxied with a bank’s Z score.   
The implementation of Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio on January 1, 2015 forced 
banks around the world to rethink and reevaluate their management of liquidity risk.  Liquidity risk 
management was a backroom treasury function with very little front office attention until the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 pushed the industry to the edge of the systemic breakdown cliff.  
Prior to the crisis, the majority of banks around the world relied on subjective judgment regarding 
liquidity levels and very little was done to force banks to shore up liquidity (Elliot, 2014).  The 
Basel Committee swiftly released the Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision (BIS, 2008) to set a global standard of liquidity risk management skills.  The Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) were key tools developed to 
stimulate more robust liquidity risk management throughout the global system and to prevent a 
repeat of the crisis (BIS, 2010)1. 
A model assessing bank profitability as a function of liquidity is utilized in this paper.  This 
model leverages the term structure of interest rates and its relationship to liquidity by way of the 
                                                          
1 See appendix for further background on Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
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liquidity preference theory to determine the impact on a bank’s ROA.   In order to conduct the 
empirical exercise, a database which isolates banks who have remained in business from Q1 2002 
to Q2 2014 has been created from the FDIC database.    
This paper is organized as follows:  Section II reviews recent literature regarding the pros and 
cons of regulation, specific Basel III metrics, related critique of the Basel III metrics, and the 
relationship between liquidity and banking profitability.  Section III outlines the data and empirical 
methods demonstrating the relationship between liquidity, profitability, and stability.  Section IV 
discusses empirical evidence and Section V concludes with an overview of the findings as well as 
a discussion of possible future research.  There is an appendix summarizing the Basel III 
regulation as it relates to liquidity. 
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II.  Literature Review 
Basel III reforms were published as a response to the financial crisis of 2007/2008.  It is the 
first attempt by international regulators to introduce consistent minimum standards for liquidity 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2010).  Two of the most controversial elements are the new liquidity 
requirements, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).  The 
LCR addresses liquidity risk intended to safeguard banks with adequate liquidity to survive one 
month of stressed funding conditions.  This metric is driving the reassessment of the types of 
products and services each bank holds, shifting many banks towards more liquid products.  The 
NSFR addresses funding risk and is designed to promote structural changes that shift banking risk 
profiles away from short-term fund mismatches and toward more stable, longer term funding of 
assets (BCBS, 2010b).  While the LCR has been actively in place in the marketplace since January 
1, 2015, the NSFR has moved from its initial launch date of 2018 to be put aside for later 
discussion (Nicol, 2017).  (See appendix for a more detailed explanation of the LCR and NSFR).   
  
Pros of Regulation 
There is a body of literature in favor of regulation.  A study of wealth effects in bank portfolios 
following the implementation of the 1988 Basel accord among banks in the Japan, Canada, and the 
UK finds that the regulatory intervention increase capital holdings and have a positive effect on 
banks (Wagster et al., 1996).   Stringent regulations have also been negatively linked to non-
performing loans (Barth et al, 2004) and positively linked to increased employee salaries 
(Molyneux and Thornton, 1992). 
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There is literature that critiques the absence of regulation.  Previous to the financial crisis of 
2007/2008, the market managed liquidity in a “crisis management” mode as opposed to proactive 
liquidity management with regulation.  The markets relied on an existence of a “lenders of last 
resort” or a few large banks that most in the industry believed to be “too big to fail” (i.e., had the 
complete backing of the government).  The industry had expectations of relying on these “lenders 
of last resort” creating a moral hazard.  Banks could hold lower levels of liquid assets than 
financial fundamentals dictate, because they knew they could rely on these “lenders of last resort” 
(Repullo, 2005).  Continual post crisis liquidity support to failed banks or close to failing banks 
fosters this disincentive for banks to manage liquidity prudently (Acharya et al., 2011). 
The recent crisis of 2007/2008 proved that deposit insurance is not adequate enough to prevent 
bank runs. The runs were on federal funds (Afonso et al., 2011), interbank markets (Acharya and 
Merrouche, 2013), repo markets (Gorton, 2009), and securitized markets (Brunnermeier, 2009).  
These are all markets not backed by deposit insurance. 
 
Cons of Regulation 
There is evidence against regulation.  Banks have been found to maintain target buffers above 
regulatory thresholds instead of working in the economy (Francis, 2010).  Kantor and Holdsworth 
(2010) argue that regulations designed to prevent future crises should not be allowed to threaten 
the profitability of financial activity to the point where raising fresh capital from the private 
markets no longer makes economic sense.   
In a related article by Hartwell (2015), a bank’s performance is driven more by individual, 
banking factors rather than country specific regulations.  He studies both ROA and ROE across 
countries during the time period of 2006 and 2012 and finds that investor protection – specifically 
7 
 
robust property rights law – are key to bank profitability.  He makes a key observation that many 
countries could institute a multitude of policies that in time of crisis would be “dwarfed by the 
impact of US monetary policy… dependent on policies undertaken thousands of miles away.” 
(Hartwell, 2015). 
Liquidity regulations may lead banks to take on more risks in other areas (Diamond and Rajan, 
2001).  Empirical evidence in a panel of Canadian and U.S. Banks over the period of 1997 to 2009 
displays a nonlinear relationship where holding liquidity is profitable for banks up to a point 
beyond which holding more liquid assets starts to diminish returns.  It forces the bank to find the 
balance between resilience to liquidity shocks with the costs of holding lower-yielding liquid 
assets instead of higher yielding, but less liquid assets.  (Bordeleau and Graham, 2010).   
 
 Basel III Critique 
A wave of critical papers was published upon the release of Basel III.  The underlying 
criticisms are in the details of applying a global mandate to a local problem.  Key issues2 include: 
1.  30 day time period:  This period has been chosen as it represents the likely 
time in which a central bank needs to step in and counter a crisis.   
2. Specific weightings assigned to assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet 
items:  Each institution works with the regulators regarding haircuts (or the 
amount to subtract from an asset with the remainder being as highly liquid) for 
each individual product.   
                                                          
2 April Frazer, Managing Director and Global Head of Regulatory Advisory and Capital 
Structuring, Wells Fargo Securities, (phone interview, April, 2015) 
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3. Assumption of large liquid financial markets:  The liquidity rules assume that 
sophisticated financial systems in advance economies.  Emerging markets seem 
to be outside of this assumption and could cause issues in small national debts 
where there are few treasury bonds and bills are held as liquid assets. 
4. Distinction between Level I & Level II Assets: Much like the product level 
haircuts above, each institution has discussions and negotiations as to which 
asset should go in which bucket  
The regular stress tests will be costly (Elliot, 2014).  In a McKinsey Working Paper 
(McKinsey, 2013), the firm estimates that the liquidity pressures due to Basel III will cost 
firms approximately 4% in lower return on common equity (ROCE) over the next 6 years.  
Basel III metrics are estimated to slow GDP growth in the range of -0.05 to -0.15 percentage 
points per annum.  These costs are estimated due to the Basel III requirements (liquidity and 
capital combined) driving increased lending spreads by approximately 15 bps if there were no 
complimentary monetary response.  The complimentary monetary response to counteract this 
affect would be a reduction or delay in increase in monetary policy rates between 30 and 80 
bps (Slovik and Cournede, 2011).  These higher costs for regulated entities will drive market 
shifts away from traditional banking to the shadow or unregulated banking sectors,  Without 
the regulatory overhead, they will have a lower cost of funds and pass it along to the market 
with cheaper funding (Cosimano and Hakura, 2011). 
 There is a concern that these metrics will drive government bond favoritism (Blundel-
Wignall and Atkinson, 2010) as the only way to maintain the high level of LCR given that state 
and sovereign government debt are labelled a Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets.  This would 
create an unintended over-concentration in government debt.  This situation will create a 
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“distorted inelastic demand” from banks on government securities (Allen et al., 2012).  They 
describe a scenario where governments and not a free market will decide on the allocation of 
these limited Level 1 securities.  There are also global concerns for lower quality 
creditworthiness and smaller countries that could not fund its own domestic bank needs.   They 
also posit that liquidity costs will actually increase from the ratios as large amounts of 
government debt will start to be locked up in banks’ liquidity portfolios to cover the ratios. 
 A bank’s traditional role as a liquidity transformer which reduces risk from mismatched 
assets and liabilities may be adversely impacted (King, 2013).  Strict application of a liquidity 
coverage ratio of 100% backing by safe liquid assets will eliminate bank runs at the cost of 
negating the banks purpose in the marketplace as the creation of liquid claims on illiquid assets 
(Dermine, 2015).   
The NSFR has also had its share of criticisms.    Approximately two thirds of the 263 banks 
in a 2009 survey were not capable of calculating the ratio (BCBS, 2010c).  In a study across 15 
countries, the associated changes required to shift the more cost effective strategies to increase 
holdings of higher-rated securities to extend the maturities is estimated to reduce net interest 
margins by 70-88 basis points on average or around 40% of their year-end 2009 value (King, 
2013).   
 
Liquidity and profitability relationship 
Liquidity is an intricate factor to study, because it has both endogenous and exogenous aspects.   
On the internal side, a bank is responsible to manage its own liquidity holdings as it sees fit to be 
able to service its customers.  There are bank specific factors such as expenses, headcount, 
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operational expenses, and product offerings (Athanasoglou, 2005).  On the external side, regulators 
have always put some sort of regulation on liquidity to stave off the high social and economic costs 
of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  These create a push and pull relationship.  Regulators 
pulling up liquidity to limit the social cost mentioned above, but banks pushing down liquidity due 
to liquid assets such as cash tend to have lower yields than less liquid assets resulting in lower 
bank revenues (Roger and Vlcek, 2011).   With Basel III, the regulators will be pulling more 
liquidity pushing down bank’s profitability. 
. The impact of bank profitability has far reaching effects.  Bank runs a huge social cost 
(Diamond and Dybivig, 1983).  Pawlowska (2016) reinforces the idea that “the banking sector 
does not affect the banks alone, but it is highly relevant for the economy as a whole.”  The theory 
behind this statement is that the banking system serves as a cushion to absorb any negative 
economic shocks and business cycle downfalls.  Banks’ profitability is important to a country as it 
safeguards the health for a country’s economy.  Notably, her paper finds no evidence for either a 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis or a relative market power (RMP) hypothesis.  
The most important factor that policy makers should focus on is improving the banking sector 
efficiency.   
 
III. Data  and Model Analytics 
Quarterly data for all US banks are downloaded from the FDIC’s Bank Data & Statistics 
website from Q1 2002 to Q2 2014.  We selected only banks that were active throughout the entire 
period.  Where a bank was acquired by another, we added in the data under the surviving entity.  
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Five different grouping of banks are examined utilizing standard FDIC Bank Classifications.  They 
are as follows:   
1. N = National Commercial Banks with a national charter supervised by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
2. SM = State commercial or savings banks supervised by the Federal Reserve  
3. NM = State commercial banks and Fed nonmember supervised by the FDIC or OCC 
4. SB = Savings banks with a state charter supervised by the FDIC 
5. SA = State chartered thrifts supervised by the OTS prior to 2011; currently supervised by 
the FDIC or OCC 
Because of our focus on domestic banks, the additional bank class of “OI” which represents U.S. 
branches of foreign chartered institutions was left out of this analysis.    
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Bank 
Class N NM SA SB SM 
            
Count 
              
33,929  
            
89,829                      95  
            
10,702  
              
19,226  
            
Asset Mean  $     7,746,251   $      531,961   $   23,532,103   $      810,970   $     2,987,427  
Asset Median  $        225,078   $        16,987   $        133,636   $      393,053   $        226,274  
Asset Std Dev  $   86,255,880   $   3,600,353   $  32,604,816   $   2,330,139   $   21,121,668  
Asset 
Skewness 15.89972 32.81103 0.807624 12.26477 18.29523 
Asset 
Kurtosis 275.3314 1333.302 1.876393 187.914 468.4399 
            
NIM Mean 4.00 4.084343 3.142994 3.375824 4.00946 
NIM Median 3.929687 4.018593 2.906688 3.368413 3.978528 
NIM Std Dev 1.153643 0.938148 0.652775 0.679585 0.789837 
NIM 
Skewness 27.83647 10.44519 1.093824 0.635892 2.44453 
NIM Kurtosis 1510.665 347.9779 4.001542 9.631665 54.4319 
            
ROA Mean 1.005898 1.035034 0.325708 0.558679 0.959052 
ROA Median 1.029865 1.049249 0.486237 0.57601 1.005552 
ROA Std Dev 0.919556 0.882572 0.928714 0.611909 0.903919 
ROA 
Skewness -6.433774 -2.332322 -2.262832 -8.502624 -3.877507 
ROA Kurtosis 192.3549 61.20685 8.939937 239.1306 74.70154 
Table 1:  Summary data of US Banks during the study time frame segmented into their different FDIC classifications (dollars in 
‘000s) (Source:  FDIC, Author’s own estimations) 
 
The database has the following data elements sourced from the FDIC: 
• Total Assets:  The sum of all assets owned by the institution including cash, loans, 
securities, bank premises, and other assets.  This total does not include off-balance-
sheet accounts.   
• Net Interest Margin:  Total interest income less total interest expense annualized as a 
percent of average earning assets.   
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• Return on Assets (ROA):  Net income after taxes and extraordinary items annualized 
as a percent of average total assets.   
• Equity Capital to Assets:  Total equity capital as a percent of total assets.  This metric 
is used to calculate the z score and highly individualized to each bank. 
•  FDIC Certificate Number:   The FDIC Certificate number is a unique identified in 
the FDIC database and used in this database as the unique identifier.  In the case of 
bank mergers and acquisition through the study period, data was rolled up under the 
surviving parent (acquirer) bank. 
We tested the liquidity-bank profitability relationship by comparing a bank’s return of 
assets (ROA) to its calculated ROAadjusted which is the new ROA after a shift of 1% of its 
illiquid assets into liquid assets.   In order to calculate the ROAadjusted, the data is run through a 
model (Handorf, 2014) which leverages the term structure of interest rates.  This takes advantage 
of the liquidity preference theory which states that rates on future maturities have an embedded 
liquidity premium.   
The model is specified as follows: 
iAiiiii tIIRHLCLSROANI **   
Equation 1:  Model utilized to determine overall net income impact (Handorf, 2014) 
 
The variables are as follows: 
• NI = the overall Net Income Decline for a specific bank 
• ROA = the Return on Asset for a specific bank 
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• LS = the liquidity shift of 1% of total assets calculated as 1% * Total Assets for a 
specific bank;  this 1% was applied consistently across all banks in the database 
• HLC = the historical liquidity cost of 1.25% (Handorf, 2014) 
• IIR = Income form the lower taxable income calculated as interest income reduction  
times marginal tax rate for a specific bank;  taxable income is applied based upon 
their Net Interest Margin (see table 2).  The model can be written in descriptive 
terms below in equation 2.   
 
Equation 2:  Model utilized to determine overall net income impact in descriptive terms (Handorf, 2014) 
 
The tax rate applied to each bank is dependent upon the Net Interest Margin (Handorf, 2014).   
Net Interest Margin Tax Rate 
Below 2.5% 15% 
2.6-3.0% 25% 
3.0 and above 35% 
Table 2:  Map of tax rates applied to ranges of Net Interest Margin 
 
The Z Score is calculated according to the World Bank definition:  
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Equation 3:  Z score equation from the World Bank 
 
 
Equation 4:  Z score equation from the World Bank in descriptive terms 
 
It should be noted that my time period was 2002-2014 which included 2007 and 2008 crisis data 
that may not accurately reflect each bank’s “typical” behavior, distorting the accuracy of the 
obtained results.  We did not run the regression with any dummy variables or additional modelling 
adjustments with our panel regressions with a deeper dive into the crisis years as a good future 
research topic. 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence  
The overall analysis suggests that the U.S. banking profitability is negatively affected by 
liquidity regulation which requires a bank to hold more liquid assets.  We also see that savings 
banks will have a more negative effect than the national banks.  As you can see from Table 3, the 
difference between the Adjusted ROA (i.e., the ROA resulting from the 1% shift) and original 
ROA averages a decrease in ROA of approximately 0.009%.   
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Table 3:  Summary of ROA, Adjusted ROA after Liquidity Shift, and the Average Difference between the Adjusted ROA 
(after the liquidity shift) and the Existing ROA (before the liquidity shift) (Source:  FDIC, Author's own estimations) 
  
This seems relatively consistent across bank types in raw numbers, but a different trend 
reveals itself when looking at the percent change or the amount of decrease ROA relative to the 
original ROA.  As shown in Figure 1, the overall group ROA decreases by 1.2% relative to the 
adjusted ROA.   This decrease is not consistent across bank types with most banking types 
hovering around the -1.0% mark.  Savings Banks (SB) lose at almost twice the rate as the national 
banks.   Savings banks start out with lower ROAs so an additional loss of 1% of assets to liquidity 
creates an even larger divide for the adjusted ROA.  Additionally, the tax savings driven by Net 
Interest Margins is on average less for Savings Banks.  We will see this reflected in the below 
section on estimators. 
N NM SA SB SM Grand Total
Avg ROA 0.981% 1.010% 0.326% 0.559% 0.959% 0.965%
Avg Adjusted ROA 0.972% 1.001% 0.316% 0.549% 0.950% 0.956%
Avg Differences in ROA (After-Before)-0.00893% -0.00885% -0.00997% -0.00952% -0.00889% -0.00892%
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Figure 1:   Average % change in ROA segmented by Bank Class (source:  FDIC, World Bank, Author's own estimation) 
 
Table 4 provides the estimators obtained using the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
technique.  GMM was chosen due to the endogeneity within the factors (Wintoki, Linck, and 
Netter, 2012).    Significance of less than 5% was found for the majority of estimators, but at small 
factors.   
 
Table 4:  GMM estimators for ROAadjusted variable 
Dependent Variable: ROAadjusted
Bank classes All N NM SA SM SB
Asset 1.17E-12 5.56E-13 1.11E-13 -4.84E-11 1.20E-11 2.85E-10
EQV 0.000379 0.000275 0.000464 -0.003 0.000474 0.000291
NIMY 0.002473 0.001849 0.002341 0.005066 0.003506 0.000267
C -0.0030223 0.000627 -0.00303 -0.005499 -0.0081 -0.00588
Obs 167,350            37,002    97,695    107              20,826    11,720    
R squared 0.07123            0.04903  0.07060  0.15459       0.09016  0.06840  
Adjusted R squared 0.07121            0.04895  0.07057  0.12997       0.09002  0.06816  
bold indicates significance of 5% or less
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 Of all the factors tested, the Net Interest Margin has the most effect across all asset classes.  
It is most prominent in the thrifts and state savings bank managed by the Fed.   Assets do not drive 
a lot of the adjusted return from an absolute numbers perspective, but we also see a 
disproportionate weighting towards the savings banks.  Equity capital assets ratio has a negative 
effect for the thrifts and small positive effects for all the other bank classes.    
 
Figure 2:  Bar charts of estimators (all bank classes) for an adjusted Return on Assets post 1% shift of liquid to illiquid assets 
 
In order to estimate stability, we look at Z scores which capture the probability of default.  
Z scores are often used at the country level to assess the default risk of a country’s banking system.  
In this study, the Z score was used on an individual bank level to assess each bank’s default risk..  
A “Before Z Score” has been calculated every year with the “before ROA” and an “After Z Score” 
calculated with the “adjusted ROA” (post liquidity shift).  As shown in Figure 3, the savings banks 
forego more stability than the rest of the classes.  It is worth noting that the SA class or the thrifts 
lose less stability than the overall average stability loss. 
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Figure 3:  Average change in Z score from liquidity shift of 1% of liquid to illiquid assets segmented by bank class (Source:  
Author's own estimations based upon FDIC and World Bank data) 
In our GMM analysis, we see significance of less than 5% for a majority of estimators.  In 
this analysis, state commercial banks (NM) seem to feel the effects of the liquidity shift more than 
the other bank classes.
 
Table 5:  GMM estimators for Z score adjusted variable 
 
Net interest margin drives Z score in the positive direction for the state and national 
commercial banks (N and NM).  We see little or insignificant lift driven for other bank classes.  
Dependent Variable: Z Score Adjusted
All N NM SA SM SB
Asset 6.48E-07 7.51E-07 1.19E-05 3.68E-11 1.82E-12 8.35E-11
EQV -153.8416 -68.6388 -1.12E+02 8.45E-05 -0.00178 -0.0017
NIMY 84.93561 33.21595 118.2772 0.000545 0.001316 0.001574
C -401.8325 -1279.76 -971.2778 -0.005499 0.004696 0.0027
Obs 153,962            33,952    89,889      107              19,250    10,772    
R squared 0.15881            0.01255  0.03560    0.15459       0.11218  0.13551  
Adjusted R squared 0.15879            0.01246  0.03557    0.12997       0.11204  0.13527  
bold indicates significance of 5% or less
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Similarly, assets affect state commercial banks and national banks the most, but with an overall 
small factor across all bank classes.  Equity capital assets have a negative effect for the national 
banks and state commercial banks.
 
Figure 4:  Bar charts of estimators (all bank classes) for an adjusted Z scores post 1% shift of liquid to illiquid assets 
 
 
V.   Conclusions 
Liquidity continues to be in the spotlight due to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 where a 
once theoretical systemic crash became reality in part due to poor liquidity risk management 
practices.  To try and avoid the reoccurrence and stimulate prudent liquidity risk practices, the 
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision has introduced key principles of liquidity risk management 
for the industry to follow and key metrics to utilize as tools.  The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
was introduced in 2010 and has a phased implementation plan since its launch in January 2015.  
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) was also introduced in 2010 with a suggested launch in 
2018, but has since been postponed. 
Our research examines the relationships between liquidity and ROA in an effort to 
understand what direction the industry may turn given the increased liquidity cushion due to the 
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implementation of the LCR.  The empirical tests show that all types of banks lose out in the shifts 
of increasing 1% of their assets from an illiquid to liquid instrument.    The average ROA loss is 
1.5% for that 1% shift with the biggest losers to be the savings banks (SB) losing almost double 
the average at 2.6%.  Stability reflects this same trend with savings banks losing approximately 
50% in stability while other banks lost smaller amounts of stability with the average loss of 38%.  
In associated GMM analyses, we see that the state run thrifts and savings banks are the most 
affected for profitability.   On the stability side, we see that net interest margins and equity capital 
to assets ratio drive most of the behavior.   
There are many avenues of research that can follow this study.  Future research includes 
further understanding if the liquidity cost in the term structure has changed since the Financial 
Crisis.  A study of banks who have not survived the entire period would perhaps magnify the 
liquidity shift affects as some may have exited the industry due to the higher operational costs.  
This study also modelled a constant 1% liquidity shift across the sample which may not accurately 
reflect today’s banking requirement. The percentage could be refined based upon a varying 
percentage of liquidity shift based upon the makeup of each bank’s assets.  And finally, a future 
study to rerun the analysis in this paper with post LCR launch data. 
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Appendix:  Basel III LCR Background  
The Basel Committee has worked hard since the previous financial crisis to create an 
environment to minimize the chances of systemic risk as experienced in 2008.  Prior to the crisis, 
liquidity was fairly cheap with costs around 10 bps in the interbank market and available in 
seemingly unlimited amounts and currencies. During the crisis, banks experienced rapid reversals 
of liquidity with those cheap interbank costs rising to above 50-60 bps. (McKinsey, 2008).   
Additionally, banks in the US lost a total of $1.3B in bank runs despite FDIC insurance coverage.   
The crisis surfaced the US banking system’s inherent lack of sound liquidity risk management 
which broke under the extreme stress of the situation (BIS, 2008).   
In 2008, the Basel Committee published their initial guiding principles (BIS 2008) to stimulate 
a higher standard level of liquidity risk management.  The 44 page document lays out 17 guiding 
principles regarding how managers should prudently manage liquidity risk and the roles that 
supervisors will play.  As an encore to that strategic and theoretical document, the Basel committee 
published its first version of liquidity management metrics called the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) (BIS, 2010).    The goal of both the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) was to encourage a more resilient 
banking environment that could absorb liquidity shocks and prevent true financial damage that 
would affect the global economy (BIS, 2010).   
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is defined as the amount of unencumbered high-quality 
assets (HQLA) to equal or exceed 100% of its total net cash outflows over a 30 day period stress 
test.  Assets are split into level 1 and level 2 assets (BIS 2013).  Level 1 assets are extremely liquid 
assets such as cash, central bank reserves, and government guaranteed short term marketable 
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securities.  Level 2 assets include riskier and less liquid public securities with differing levels of 
haircuts depending on their risk.  The metric is defined as follows: 
 
The LCR roll out started in January 2015 a minimum of an LCR equaling 60% building with equal 
annual steps to reach 100% by January 2019.   
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is a longer term ratio to address liquidity mismatches, 
focusing on both on and off balance sheet activities (BIS, 2014).  The ratio aims to reduce the 
chances of disruptions from creative balance sheet management techniques that might slowly 
erode away a liquidity position.  Assets under scrutiny with this ratio include short term exposure 
to banks and other financial institutions with particular mention about derivatives and assets posted 
as initial margin for derivative contracts.  The NSFR originally submitted for launch in 2018 is 
now postponed to a later unspecified date. 
The metrics are to be employed in a variety of stress tests including deposit run-offs, loss of 
wholesale funding capacity, loss of short term financing with certain collateral and counterparties, 
and other increases in outflows due to contractual and market volatility factors.   These tests are to 
be run on a regular basis from daily to annually depending on the bank and types of assets.   
The LCR is applied across all banks in the US by the Federal Reserve as part of the Enhanced 
Prudential Standards (EPS) package.  This is also be applied not just to banks but also to bank 
holding companies with over $50B in assets.  (Federal Reserve, 2014) 
Supervisors will be looking for the data from these metrics and associated stress tests on at 
least a monthly basis, creating a greatly increased level of regulatory reporting which presents 
24 
 
certain operational and strategic challenges.  The calculation of these metrics varies from daily, 
monthly, and annually depending on the asset with intraday calculations given much attention in 
the latest definition of the tools.  As imagined, there are significant informational systems and 
reporting processes that need to be in place in order for this timely and accurate monitoring.  The 
pre-crisis centralized Treasury systems may no longer work for institutions that need to be 
responsive to both customers and regulators.   In a McKinsey and Company bank survey, all 
participants required liquidity risk measurement system upgrades including more sophisticated 
liquidity modeling and dashboards to give real time (intraday) limits and early warning indicators  
(McKinsey, 2008).  
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